

# PROBING THE LIMITS OF VIRTUALIZED SOFTWARE PROTECTION



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

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
**Natalia Stakhanova**  
**University of New Brunswick**




- Research Overview
- Research Objectives
- Background and Related Research
- Methodology
- Results
- Future Work
- Questions?









Virtualization(Static)



Virtualization(Dynamic)



Static Translation




Dynamic Translation



- General Purpose

- Protect software algorithms from man at the end attacks
  - Code injection techniques
  - Reverse engineering
- Force the attacker into a rewrite attack. (Collberg)






- General Purpose
  - Protect software algorithms from man at the end attacks

*Disassembler  
& Decompiler*



Static  
Analysis



Dynamic  
Analysis






- Explore existing virtualization techniques.
- Examine known subversion methods.
- Introduce an alternative subversion method(s).
- Suggest improvements to existing techniques to better protect legitimate use of virtualization in software protection.



- What is code injection?
  - The ultimate goal of a code injection attack is to change the control flow or flow of execution in a software system in such a way that anti-cloning resilience mechanism are subverted or intellectual property protections are nullified.
- General case
  - Piracy
  - Minor software manipulation.





- Example:

- When executing a piece of software “IP” (intellectual property) the following may be expected:

*Enter a Valid License Key:*

- With some output based on the users input:

*The license key is not valid. Please check with your vendor.*

- OR:

*The license key is valid.*

*You may execute the protected IP.*

*Starting to execute protected IP.*


*Finished executing protected IP.*



- Example:

Dump of assembler code for function checkLicense:

```
0x08048361 <+0>: push %ebp
0x08048362 <+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x08048364 <+3>: sub $0x18,%esp
0x08048367 <+6>: call 0x80482d8 <getLicense>
0x0804836c <+11>: movl $0x80a7bfe,0x4(%esp)
0x08048374 <+19>: mov %eax,(%esp)
0x08048377 <+22>: call 0x8054b40
0x0804837c <+27>: test %eax,%eax
0x0804837e <+29>: jne 0x8048393
<checkLicense+50>
0x08048380 <+31>: movl $0x80a7c0c,(%esp)
0x08048387 <+38>: call 0x80492e0
0x0804838c <+43>: call 0x8048250 <IP>
0x08048391 <+48>: jmp 0x804839f
<checkLicense+62>
0x08048393 <+50>: movl $0x80a7c48,(%esp)
0x0804839a <+57>: call 0x80492e0
0x0804839f <+62>: leave
0x080483a0 <+63>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```






- Example:

Dump of assembler code for function checkLicense:

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0x0804839a <+57>: call 0x80492e0
0x0804839f <+62>: leave
0x080483a0 <+63>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```





- Example:

Using GDB we perform the following changes which modify the jne byte changing it to a NOP:

- set \*(unsigned char\*)0x804837e=0x90
- set \*(unsigned char\*)0x804837f=0x90

And we observe the following outputs after running the program:

- The license key is valid.

You may execute the protected IP.

Starting to execute protected IP.

Finished executing protected IP.


Dump of assembler code for function checkLicense:

```
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0x080483a0 <+63>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```

Can virtualization protect against this?



- RedPill/Blue Pill (Rutkowska)




- Cyclical nature of obfuscation and security in general.
- Lack of cohesion and coupling. (Scott 2003)
  - Ghosh/Hu/Davidson 2012

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```
int swallow_redpill () {  
    unsigned char m[2+4], rpill[] = "\x0f\x01\x0d\x00\x00\x00\x00\xc3";  
    *((unsigned*)&rpill[3]) = (unsigned)m;  
    ((void(*)())&rpill)();  
    return (m[5]>0xd0) ? 1 : 0;  
}
```

---



## Two Prerequisites

1. The attacker must be able to locate the entry function (EP) of the protective PVM in PV .
2. The attacker must be aware of the guest application's instruction set architecture.





- Rolles
  1. Reverse engineer the virtual machine.
  2. Detect locations at which control flow enters the virtualization obfuscator.
  3. Develop a procedure for producing a disassembler, given a protected executable.
  4. Disassemble the byte code and convert it into intermediate code.
  5. Apply compiler optimizations to the IR.
  6. Generate x86 code.



- Roles

- Requires a highly skilled attacker
  - Large amounts of reverse engineering
  - Architecture specific
  - Costly and time consuming
- Highly Effective
- Still usually cheaper than rewrite attacks



1. Create a standardized target program for protection.
2. Choose a representative protection technique (Forms of PVM).
3. For each representative technique perform MATE attacks.
4. Provide measurements. (Overhead or proof of concept)



## 2. Static PVM

- Static Analysis

- Algorithm only virtualizers have trivially locatable entry points.
- Full code virtualizers are persistent and require additional analysis.  
May agree with Rolle's findings.

- Dynamic analysis

- Dynamic injection could be precise if performed manually.
- Shotgun approaches are effective.
- Brute force methods can be effective.



## 2. Dynamic PVM

- Static Analysis

- Highly obfuscated
- Static analysis alone is almost completely ineffective

- Dynamic Analysis

- Entry point location is negligible
- Swap functions create patterns
- Hash table's in STRATA create multiple attack vectors.



### 3. Perform Mate Attacks

- Static Virtualizers

- Vulnerable to shotgun and brute force as predicted
- Vulnerable to Rolle's Method

- Dynamic Virtualizers

- Highly effective against all automated injections.
- Vulnerable to Ghosh method




### 3. Perform Mate focusing on PVM

- Static Virtualizers

- Fully resistant
  - Code is stored in a persistent virtual state
  - Reliant on the interpreter
  - High Coupling

- Dynamic Virtualizers

- Trivial subversion given the entry point
- Multiple known methods for entry points detection





```

0x090cf275 <+126>: mov     0x410(%eax), %edx
0x090cf27b <+132>: mov     0x8(%ebx), %eax
0x090cf27e <+135>: cmp     (%edx), %eax
0x090cf280 <+137>: jb      0x90cf29a <strata_build_main+163>
0x090cf282 <+139>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf285 <+142>: call    0x90d18f4 <hashtable_get_default>
0x090cf28a <+147>: mov     0x410(%eax), %edx
0x090cf290 <+153>: mov     0x8(%ebx), %eax
0x090cf293 <+156>: cmp     0xc(%edx), %eax
0x090cf296 <+159>: ja      0x90cf29a <strata_build_main+163>
0x090cf298 <+161>: jmp     0x90cf2c1 <strata_build_main+202>
0x090cf29a <+163>: call    0x90e68eb <targ_thread_id>
0x090cf29f <+168>: mov     %eax, 0xc(%esp)
0x090cf2a3 <+172>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x090cf2a6 <+175>: mov     0x8(%eax), %eax
0x090cf2a9 <+178>: mov     %eax, 0x8(%esp)
0x090cf2ad <+182>: movl    $0x92d0b74, 0x4(%esp)
0x090cf2b5 <+190>: movl    $0x92d0b92, (%esp)
0x090cf2bc <+197>: call    0x90d1290 <strata_log>
0x090cf2c1 <+202>: incl    0x9357e80
0x090cf2c7 <+208>: mov     0x9357e80, %eax
0x090cf2cc <+213>: cmp     0x93e0be0, %eax
0x090cf2d2 <+219>: jl      0x90cf2e8 <strata_build_main+241>
0x090cf2d4 <+221>: cmpl    $0x0, 0x93e0be0
0x090cf2db <+228>: jle     0x90cf2e8 <strata_build_main+241>
0x090cf2dd <+230>: mov     0x8(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf2e0 <+233>: mov     %eax, -0x68(%ebp)
0x090cf2e3 <+236>: jmp     0x90cf583 <strata_build_main+908>
0x090cf2e8 <+241>: call    0x90cffb2 <flush_based_on_timer>
0x090cf2ed <+246>: call    0x90d008f <rekey_based_on_timer>
0x090cf2f2 <+251>: call    0x90e68eb <targ_thread_id>
0x090cf2f7 <+256>: mov     %eax, 0xc(%esp)
0x090cf2fb <+260>: mov     0x9357e80, %eax
0x090cf300 <+265>: mov     %eax, 0x18(%esp)
0x090cf304 <+269>: mov     0x8(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf307 <+272>: mov     %eax, 0x14(%esp)
0x090cf30b <+276>: cmpl    $0x0, 0xc(%esp)
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x090cf30f <+280>: je      0x90cf323 <strata_build_main+300>
0x090cf311 <+282>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf314 <+285>: mov     0x28(%eax), %eax
0x090cf317 <+288>: mov     0x92fd7c0, (%eax, 4), %eax
0x090cf31e <+295>: mov     %eax, -0xc(%ebp)
0x090cf321 <+300>: jmp     0x90cf32a <strata_build_main+307>
0x090cf323 <+300>: movl    $0x92d0b9d, -0xc(%ebp)
0x090cf32a <+307>: mov     -0xc(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf32d <+310>: mov     %eax, 0x10(%esp)
0x090cf331 <+314>: cmpl    $0x0, 0xc(%ebp)
0x090cf335 <+318>: je      0x90cf342 <strata_build_main+331>
0x090cf337 <+320>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf33a <+323>: mov     0x4(%eax), %eax
0x090cf33d <+326>: mov     %eax, -0x70(%ebp)
0x090cf340 <+329>: jmp     0x90cf349 <strata_build_main+338>
0x090cf342 <+331>: movl    $0x0, -0x70(%ebp)
0x090cf349 <+338>: mov     -0x70(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf34c <+341>: mov     %eax, 0xc(%esp)
0x090cf350 <+345>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf353 <+348>: mov     %eax, 0x18(%esp)
0x090cf357 <+352>: movl    $0x92d0bc0, 0x4(%esp)
0x090cf35f <+360>: movl    $0x92d0b51, (%esp)
0x090cf366 <+367>: call    0x90d1290 <strata_log>
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x090cf36b <+372>: call    0x90e68eb <targ_thread_id>
0x090cf370 <+377>: mov     %eax, 0x18(%esp)
0x090cf374 <+381>: mov     0x9357e80, %eax
0x090cf379 <+386>: mov     %eax, 0x14(%esp)

```

```

=> 0x090cf203 <+12>: call    0x90d18f4 <hashtable_get_default>
0x090cf208 <+17>: movl    $0x1, 0x8(%eax)
0x090cf20f <+24>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf212 <+27>: mov     %eax, 0x4(%esp)
0x090cf216 <+31>: mov     0x8(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf219 <+34>: mov     %eax, (%esp)
0x090cf21c <+37>: call    0x90cf034 <strata_enter_builder>
0x090cf221 <+42>: call    0x90d18f4 <hashtable_get_default>
0x090cf226 <+47>: cmpl    $0x0, 0x424(%eax)
0x090cf22d <+54>: jne     0x90cf236 <strata_build_main+63>

```

```

0x090cf296 <+159>: ja      0x90cf29a <strata_build_main+163>
0x090cf298 <+161>: jmp     0x90cf2c1 <strata_build_main+202>
0x090cf29a <+163>: call    0x90e68eb <targ_thread_id>
0x090cf29f <+168>: mov     %eax, 0xc(%esp)
0x090cf2a3 <+172>: mov     0xc(%ebp), %eax
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x090cf2a6 <+175>: mov     0x8(%eax), %eax
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0x090cf2dd <+230>: mov     0x8(%ebp), %eax
0x090cf2e0 <+233>: mov     %eax, -0x68(%ebp)
0x090cf2e3 <+236>: jmp     0x90cf583 <strata_build_main+908>
0x090cf2e8 <+241>: call    0x90cffb2 <flush_based_on_timer>
0x090cf2ed <+246>: call    0x90d008f <rekey_based_on_timer>

```





- Dynamic Virtualizers
  - Recognizable Entry Pattern
  - 73.3% (11/15 trial runs) success rate with shotgun approach after the pattern was deduced.



- Dynamic Virtualizers

- Given the success rate of the deduced pattern an automated algorithm could be implemented directly as a script.
- Small changes to STRATA would render that script ineffective and a representative or modeled approach may be more relevant.



## 4. Overhead Analysis

- Static Virtualizers
  - Conclusion that the Rolle's research is accurate.
- Dynamic Virtualizers
  - Linear increase in security
  - Size/time: 1x – 3x



## • Dynamic Virtualizers


	BIND				Apache			
	Native	SDT-only	SDT-based ISR	SDT-based ISR Expansion	Native	SDT-only	SDT-based ISR	SDT-based ISR Expansion
Disk image	1811	1872	2731	1.51x	916	987	1617	1.77x
text	1786	1838	2690	1.51x	875	939	1566	1.79x
data	23	28	32	1.39x	34	39	43	1.26x
bss	13	32	41	3.15x	166	186	194	1.17x

**Table 3:** Resident set size overhead (Megabytes).

Zone File Size (BIND) or Web Page Size (Apache)	BIND				Apache			
	Native	SDT-only	SDT-based ISR	Expansion	Native	SDT-only	SDT-based ISR	Expansion
1K	1.6	5.7	7.0	4.38x	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
10K	3.5	7.5	8.9	2.54x	0.7	3.0	3.6	5.14x
100K	22.0	26.0	27.4	1.24x	0.7	3.0	3.6	5.14x
1000K	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.7	3.0	3.6	5.14x



## • Dynamic Virtualizers





- Static virtualizer packages vary from extremely effective to almost completely ineffective.
  - Full code virtualization (high coupling)
  - Algorithm virtualization (low coupling)
- Dynamic virtualizers suffer from an additional low coupling problem.



- Effective static virtualizers reduce the number of automated attack but remain vulnerable to shotgun and brute force methods.
  - Algorithm only virtualizer have negligible benefit given their overhead costs.
- They also require the Rolles' method at a minimum for persistent effective injection.
  - High cost manual process



- Dynamic virtualizers can fully protect the code against automated injection.
  - Can't protect themselves
  - Low coupling
  - Very high overhead costs
- Low cost attacks can bypass.
  - Entry point injection
  - Ghosh Method
- Interestingly they make the Rolle's method even more costly.





- Static/Dynamic Hybrids
  - Static virtualizers suffer from automated brute force style injections
  - Dynamic virtualizers suffer from low coupling
  - Each protects against the others flaw
  - Research into the costs and benefits of a hybrid approach could be performed



- Virtual Dependency
  - Design the software to run reliant on the hypervisor
  - Decreases overhead/Software engineering issue
  - Ghosh subversion approach still viable
- Multi-Process
  - Armadillo
- Hardware Integration
  - Adds additional coupling
  - Arc Injection Protection
  - Cryptographically secure block signing



- ✓ Explore existing virtualization techniques.
  - Static Virtualization and Software Dynamic Translation
  
- ✓ Examine known subversion methods.
  - Ghosh and Rolles
  
- ✓ Introduce an alternative subversion method.
  - Manual Context Switch Injection
  
- ✓ Suggest improvements to existing techniques to better protect legitimate use of virtualization in software protection.
  - Hybrids, Dependencies, or Hardware Integration

